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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper investigates the effect of entrepreneurs'personal income tax
situations on the growth rates of their enterprises.We analyze the per-
sonal income tax returns of a large number of soleproprietors before and
after the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and determine howthe substantial
reductions in marginal tax rates associated with thatlaw affected the
growth of their firms as measured bygross receipts. We find that individ-
ual income taxes exert a statistically and quantitativelysignificant influ-
ence on firm growth rates. Raising the sole proprietor's tax price (one
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minus the marginal tax rate) by 10 percentincreases receipts by about 8.4
percent. This finding is consistentwith the view that raising income tax
rates discourages the growth ofsmall businesses.
1. INTRODUCTION
The health and vitality of entrepreneurialenterprises is a matter of sub-
stantial policy concern. In this context, a gooddeal of attention has been fo-
cused on the question of whether the tax systemimpedes the creation and
growth of small firms. Certainly, many entrepreneursbelieve that it does:
As an entrepreneur, I experience first handthe horrors of our tax system. It
has grown into a monstrous predator thatkills incentives, swallows time, and
chokes the hopes and dreams of many (KempCommission, as quoted in Engen
and Skinner, 1996).
In fact, however, not much is knownabout how an entrepreneur's tax
situation affects the growth of his orher business.1 The purpose of the
present paper is to investigate thisissue. We analyze the income tax
returns of a large group of soleproprietors before and after the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) and determinehow their firms' growth rates
were affected by thatlaw's substantial reductions in marginal tax rates.
In effect, we seek to find outwhether the firms with the largest de-
creases in tax rates grew thefastest.
Section 2 provides a framework forthe analysis. We address the ques-
tion of why, on a priori grounds, onemight expect a sole proprietor's
personal tax situation to affect the growth ofhis or her enterprise. Sec-
tion 3 describes the data used in ouranalysis. Section 4 presents our
statistical model and results. To anticipate theconclusions, we find that
individual income taxes exert a substantialinfluence on firm growth
rates. For example, raising theentrepreneur's "tax price" (one minus the
marginal tax rate) by 10 percent increasesfirm size as measured by gross
receipts by 8.4 percentan elasticityof 0.84. Section 5 concludes with a
summary and suggestions forfuture research.
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
In this section we review whateconomic theory has to tell us about the
influence of taxes on the growth ofentrepreneurial enterprises. As it
A related question that has received somecareful attention is whether taxes affect the
propensity to be self-employed. Although not central tothe present study, we present
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turns out, the bottom line is that theoryyields no unambiguous predic-
tions. Nevertheless, the analysisidentifies the sources of the ambiguity
and provides a useful frameworkfor interpreting the empiricalresults.
Technical details are included in theAppendix.
To begin, focus on the decisionsconfronting an entrepreneur whowifi remain in business indefinitely (i.e.,momentarily ignore the effect of
taxes on business survival). Nextsuppose the entrepreneur facesa reduc-
tion in his marginal tax rate.2 Thisgenerates two conflicting effects. First,
with a lower tax bite there isan increased reward for effort devotedto the enterprise. Typically,one would assume that this raises theentrepre- neur's exertions. At thesame time, however, the old level of effort
translates into greater after-tax profits.Thus, the entrepreneurmay be
tempted to enjoy these fruits by livinga little betterconsuming more
goods and, also, leisure. This is thefamiliar conflict of substitutionand income effects, and from introspectionalone, the net effect is unclear.
Theory does not carrya strong prediction about even the directionof the impact of taxes on entrepreneurialefforts.
This fundamental ambiguity spillsover into the effect of taxes on the
myriad activities of theentrepreneurial venture. The entrepreneurpro- duces output by combining hiseffort with purchased inputs suchas hired labor, capital, materials,and so forth. If taxes alter thelevel of
entrepreneurial effort, he may respond byre-balancing the mix of other
inputs. The nature of the re-balancing,however, is not obvious. Some
inputs are substitutes forowner's effort (one could hirea manager to
supervise the operation), while othersare complements (if the owner
chooses to close on weekends,there is no need foran employee to
handle the cash register). Hence,just like the owner's effort, thesign of the effect of taxeson the demands for the othercomponents of the
production process is ambiguous. Ifthe effect on the usage of allinputs
(including entrepreneurial effort)is ambiguous, so is the effecton out- put, and, assuming the price ofoutput is unaffected, so is the effecton receipts. It follows that the overalleffect on the size of the businessis theoretically ambiguous.
Of course, as is well known,small businesses both startup and fail at
significant rates. Hence,we must also consider the implications ofa tax reduction on the relativeattractiveness of being an entrepreneurvs. working in a wage or salary job.One might suppose thatan income tax
is neutral in this respect, becauseincome from all activities is taxedat the
same rate. As shown formally in the Appendix,however, the net effect on the choice between entrepreneurshipand a wagesalary job isun-
2 Since this isan election year, it is unseemly to discussan increase in tax rates.124Carroll, Holtz-Eakin, Rider & Rosen
clear. The ambiguity arisesbecause the decision is notexclusively deter-
mined by financial considerations,but rather by overall levelsof utility
in each activity. In each case, asmall reduction in taxes wouldraise after-
tax earnings. Thiswould, in turn, translate intohigher consumption.
However, the associated changein utility in each modedepends on its
marginal utility of consumption, andthere is no reason for themarginal
utilities to be the same.
Our discussion followsthe tradition of viewing effects onrelative
prices as the main mechanismthrough which taxes affect economicout-
comes. However,price incentives may not be theonly channel by which
taxes affect entrepreneurs.Specifically, to the extent that theentrepre-
neur isliquidity-constrained3 the increase in cashflow associated with a
decrease in taxes wifi increasethe demand for capital, whichin turn wifi
increase the enterprise's outputand receipts. Since theprice-incentive
and liquidity-constraint stories arenot mutually exclusive, wewifi not
attempt to disentangle them in ouranalysis.
Another important questionthat is finessed in the simplemodel is
which tax rate is relevant. Wehave assumed that the relevant taxrate is
that on ordinary income. In contrast,much of the popular discussionof
this matter has focused on thecapital-gains rate. A writer inthe Wall
Street Journal, for example,stated that he was "of a class of entrepreneurs
who feel shackled by the highcapital gains tax in our country"and that
his "companies would have grownbetter and faster" with alower
capital-gains tax (Rigby, 1996, p.A18).
To think about this matter,consider a variety of scenarios. Inthe first,
an entrepreneurWe'llcall her Smithruns a simpleconsulting busi-
ness and reports herincome on Schedule C. Heronly input is her time,
and her receipts consist of paymentsfor her advice. In this setting,there
is no vehicle for "retainedearnings" or "plowing funds backinto the
business," and the ordinary tax rateis the relevant one.
Suppose now that Smith notonly uses her own time, she also pur-
chases paper and hires anassistant. These purchased inputs arefully
deductible against her receipts,and thus do not change the basic story.
The ordinary income rateapplies to the enterprise's net income.
Suppose further that Smithpurchases capital assets, such as comput-
ers, office equipment, or evena structure to househer burgeoning busi-
ness. If so, to the extentthat her annual investment isunder $25,000, it is
Fazzari, Hubbard, and Peterson(1988) argue that corporate investmentdecisions are
limited by lack of access to capital;Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen (1994b)document the
same phenomenon for soleproprietorships.Personal Income Taxes and the Growth of Small Firms125
fully deductible ("expensed") in theyear of purchase.4 Thus, the ordi-
nary income tax rate is the relevant rate for determining the netcost of
the investment. To the extent that investment exceeds$25,000, it must
be depreciated; if so, the value of the depreciationallowances in any
given year wifi depend on that year's ordinary incometax rates.
The assets generate income for the firm, whichis taxed at ordinary
rates on Schedule C. The assets can also generate income for thefirm if
they appreciate in value and Smith sells them. Ifso, the appreciated-
value component of such assetsmay be taxed at either the capital-gains
rate or the ordinary income tax rate. The key issue is whetheran asset
qualifies as a capital asset for the business. Capitalassets are all assets
except the company's stock in trade (inventory property),accounts receiv-
able, copyrights and musical/literary materials,commodities, hedges,
and supplies. Thus, for example, ifan art dealer sells a painting from
inventory, then any appreciation in value is taxedas ordinary income.5 It
is certainly possible, then, that for certain sole proprietorsthe capital-
gains tax rate may be relevant in this context. We haveno way of de-
termining the importance of this possibility. It is interestingto note,
however, that in any given year, considerably fewerthan one-half of sole
proprietors make any capital investments at all (Carroll,Holtz-Eakin,
Rider, and Rosen, 2000b,p. 431).
In the next scenario, Smith sells thecompany altogether. Suppose she
sells the company for $100,000 in cash. The sales price willreflect not
only appreciation of capital assets, but also intangibleassets such as
good will, going-concern value, know-how, etc. Fortax purposes, she
subtracts her basis in the company from the $100,000, and thedifference
is taxed at the capital-gains rate. We haveno direct evidence relating to
the importance of such transactions. However, ina recent careful
analysis of 1985 data on capital-gains realizations, sales ofbusiness as-
sets by sole proprietors were not sufficiently largeeven to merit atten-
tion as a separate item (Auten and Wilson, 1999).
Finally, suppose that Smith goes public with her firm. Thekey thing
to realize here is that going public is nota taxable event per se. At the
See Section 179 of the Internal Revenue Code. For taxyear 2000, the Section 179 expens-
ing limit is $20,000. In tax years 2001 and 2002, it will rise to $24,000. Intax year 2003 and
thereafter it will be $25,000.
In contrast, if the dealer sells the art gallery itself, the income will betreated as a capital
gain. Certain depreciable capital assets ("section 1231 assets") receive particularlyfavorable
treatment. They receive capital gains treatment when the aggregate of thegains from their
sale is positive, but ordinary treatment of aggregate losses; i.e., the losslimitations do not apply.126Carroll, Holtz-E akin, Rider & Rosen
time of an initial public offering (IPO),the sole proprietor receives
shares in the new corporation, and thecapital-gains tax is not paid
until such time as those shares are sold.At that time, the capital-gains
tax rate is applied to thedifference between the sales of stock and
Smith's basis in the stock. An IPO is just oneof several ways in which
a business can besold in whole or in part via some type oftax-free
exchange. For example, Smith might receivestock in the acquiring
company. For our purposes,the story is basically the same. The capital-
gains rate is not relevant until such time asthe newly-acquired stock is
sold. If the stock is not sold before theowner's death, the capital
appreciation may never be taxed at all.
Taking all these scenarios together, what can weconclude about the
relevant tax rate? The theoretically ideal tax rateis a weighted average of
the contemporaneous ordinary income tax rateand the expected present
discounted value of the relevant capital-gains tax ratefor that component
which eventually is accorded capital-gainstreatment. However, the
capital-gains rate may or may not ever beapplicable, and if so, one does
not know how many years in thefuture. The expected present discounted
value of the relevant capital-gains ratefor a sole proprietor would in most
cases probably be quitesmall, especially given that the expectation is
taken over states of the world that includefailure of the enterprise. In light
of all these considerations, as apractical matter, the ordinary tax rate
seems the appropriate one to usein the analysis of the behavior or sole
proprietors.
3. DATA
Our data are drawn from the Statisticsof Income individual tax files for
1985 and 1988, a panel consisting of62,159 tax returns for taxpayers
present in both years. These files containdetailed information on taxpay-
ers' income and deductions taken fromtheir Form 1040. We excluded
from our sample taxpayers filing asheads of household, married filing
separately, surviving spouses, taxpayerswith duplicate (and likely erro-
neous) returns in either year, and thosewho reported income on a fiscal-
year basis. This left uswith 56,701 returns.
We next selected only individuals aged25 to 55 in 1985 in order to
avoid complications that would arise becauseof younger sole propri-
etors' labor-market entry decisions andolder sole proprietors' impend-
ing retirements. This further reducedthe sample size by 20,141 to
36,360. We also eliminate taxpayers who weresubject to the alternative
minimum tax (AMT), as our tax calculatordid not permit accurate corn-Personal Income Taxes and the Growth of SmallFirms127
putations of all taxpayers' marginal tax rates under theAMT.6 The result
was a sample of 32,662 tax returns. Finally,we eliminated dependent
returns and those who changed filing status between 1985 and1988. The
end result of this process is a sample of 31,034returns.
Our basic sample consists of individuals whofiled a Schedule C in
both 1985 and 1988, of whom thereare 6,817.In principle, results
drawn from such a sample might be subjectto selectivity biassole
proprietors who survive until 1988 may not bea random sample of the
1985 group. Our econometric procedure, describedbelow, attempts to
take this selectivity problem into account.
Table 1 summarizes how the income-generatingactivities of the sam-
ple of 8,675 individuals who fileda Schedule C in 1985 changed from
1985 to 1988. The first row shows the proportion of soleproprietors who
exited that organizational form between 1985 and 1988.It indicates that
8.59 percent of the individuals who had Schedule Cincome but no wage
in 1985 income exited by 1988. For individuals whoreported both Sched-
ule C income and wage income in 1985, 21.2percent were no longer sole
proprietors by 1988. The remaining fourrows provide information on
transitions from sole proprietorships to particulartypes of income-
generating activity. The second row focuseson transitions to wage earn-
ing without any business income (definedas income from a partnership
or Subchapter S corporation). 2.9 percent of the individuals who had
only Schedule C income in 1985 and 12.6percent of those who were
initially sole proprietors and wageearners made such a transition.
The figures in parentheses show the proportion ofindividuals in the
column who made the type of transaction indicatedin the row. For
example, of the individuals with Schedule C incomeonly in 1985 who
then exited self-employment, 33.8percent became wage earners only.
The third, fourth, and fifth rows provide analogousinformation for exits
from sole proprietorships to business incomeonly, wage income and
business income, and neither wage incomenor business income (retire-
ment), respectively.
Taken as a whole, Table 1 indicates that the overallexit rate is much
lower for those returns that have only ScheduleC income. Also, exits
from sole proprietorship are split roughly evenlyamong exits to another
6More specifically, we generally observe AMT preferences onlyfor taxpayers subject to
the AMT. From an operational point of view, it isvery difficult to calculate tentative AMT
when holding income constant. We also excluded dependentfilers and individuals who
changed marital status. This led to the deletion of 1,628 observations.
We required those who filed a Schedule C in 1985 to havepositive values for gross receipts.128Carroll, Holtz-Eakin, Rider & Rosen
TABLE 1
Transitions in Income-Generating Activit!, forSole Proprietors in 1985:
1985 vs. 1988a
Each entry shows the fraction of sole proprietors in 1985who ceased filing a Schedule C in 1988,
and in 1988 were engaged in the activity in the corresponding row.The figures in parentheses show
the percentage of individuals in each column who are inthe corresponding row.
Business Income is income from a partnership orSubchapter S Corporation.
business form, wage-earning, and bothbusiness and wage-earning. A
smaller fraction retires. Comparing acrosscolumns, for those who begin
with some wages in addition to Schedule Cincome (recall, for joint filers
these may be the earnings of the spouse), thereis a much greater propen-
sity to move to strictly wages and wagesplus business, and a lower
propensity to move to strictly business.
Our sole proprietors have much higherincomes than taxpayers as a
whole, a finding that is consistent withearlier research. In 1985, the
mean adjusted gross income(AGI) in our sample of sole proprietors was
$177,267; the mean for all tax returns was $22,683.Also consistent with
previous research (see, for example,Hamilton, 2000) is the tremendous
variation in income among soleproprietorsthe standard deviation of
AGI was $1,845,269. The distribution ofsole proprietors' incomes is also
very skewed; median AGI wasonly $54,797. Not surprisingly, the key
components of AGI exhibited qualitativelysimilar patterns. Mean wages
and salaries on the returns were $116,572(s.d. = $461,994), with a me-
dian of $25,413. Mean capital income(the sum of interest and dividends)
was $50,140 (s.d. =$353,160), with a median of $2,197. In our context,it
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incomethe mean in our sample was $95,726 (s.d.= $618,850), but the
median only $6,593.
As is well known, our sample period coincides witha general widen-
ing of the income distribution. For example, in thetax-filing population
the cutoff for the bottom 25 percent of the distributionof modified ad-
justed gross income8 was $7,962 in 1985. By 1988, thisgrew only 1.7
percent to $8,100. In contrast, the cutoffs for the 90th, 95th,and 99th
percentiles grew 12.6, 14.5, and 28.4 percent, respectively.
Among sole proprietors, this widening is lesspronounced and fo-
cused among those at the lower end of the distribution.For example,
among survivors (those who were sole proprietors in both 1985and
1988) who started in the bottom 25percent in 1985, mean modified AGI
fell by 14.9 percent. In contrast, themean growth rates in the other
quartiles as well as the top 5 percentwere positive and tightly bunched
between 9.4 and 11.2 percent. In short, with theexception of the low-
est quartile, income growth among sole proprietorswas fairly even
throughout the income distribution. Thus, it isunlikely that our results
wifi be driven by autonomous growth in theupper tail of the income
distribution.9
How large are enterprises owned by soleproprietors? The size of an
enterprise can be measured in severalways, including number of em-
ployees, units of output produced, andrevenues. Various measures
appear in the literature. Gentry and Hubbard (1998) focuson gross re-
ceipts. On the other hand, Evans (1987) studiesemployment, although
he reports that analyses of firms' sales andemployment growth rates
yield similar results (p. 659). Tax-return data includeinformation only on
revenues, so they are the focus of our analysis.'° Specifically,we use
gross receipts from line 1(a) of Schedule C. Of course, two firmswith the
same gross receipts could be in very different financial health, depend-
ing on their costs. Nevertheless,we choose to focus on gross rather than
net receipts because tax data do not include informationon economic
costs and hence do not allow an economically meaningfulmeasure of
net receipts.
8 Modified AGI is thesum of AGI, excluded capital gains, excluded dividends, andex- cluded unemployment compensation.
The basic picture is unchanged if we include inour computations those who exited sole
proprietorship between 1985 and 1988. The corresponding growthrate in this sample for the bottom 25 percent is 9.3 percent. Themean growth rates at the upper end range
between 9.7 and 11.1 percent.
10 While there isno information on employment, there are data on the firm'swage bill,
which allow one to study whether taxes affect the dichotomousdecision of whether or not
to hire labor. See Carroll, Holtz-Eakin, Rider, and Rosen (2000a).130Carroll, Holtz-Eakin, Rider & Rosen
Regardless of the particulars of our measure,the sole proprietors in
our sample constitute animportant component of entrepreneurial eco-
nomic activity. According to the Bureauof Economic Analysis, national
income in 1985 was $3,380.4 billion,of which $2,769.9 billion (82 percent)
was attributable todomestic business income. The InternalRevenue
Service's Statistics of Income (SOl) estimatesthat non-farm sole propri-
etors reported gross receipts of$540 billion, or approximately 20 percent
of domestic business income in 1985.
Based on SOT sample weights, our originalsample of 62,159 returns
reported gross receipts of $473.8 billion-88 percentof the SOl total. The
process of sample exclusionslowers the economic activity represented
by the sample, but it remains significant.For example, our basic sample
of 8,675 returns accounts for 59 percent ($320.8billion) of the SOl total
(those with positive receipts in both 1985and 1988 account for 49 per-
cent, or $266 billion).
Using another measure of their importance,the wage billpayments
by sole proprietors to hiredlaboryields a very similar pattern. Our
basic sample of 8,675 returns comprises62 percent ($266 billion) of the
SOT estimate of total wage payments bysole proprietors. By either mea-
sure, our sample accountsfor a significant proportion of entrepreneurial
activity.
An important implicit assumption inthis discussion is that we can
identify sole proprietors as "entrepreneurs."Is this sensible? In the non-
statistical literature on this topic, entrepreneurs aretypically identified by
their daring, risktaking, animal spirits,and so forth. However, statistical
work forces us to settle for more prosaic,observable criteria for classifying
someone as an entrepreneur.With tax-return data, the most sensible
proxy for entrepreneurship isthe presence of a Schedule C in thereturn.11
It has been suggested that the presenceof Schedule C is more indica-
tive of tax-sheltering activity thanentrepreneurial activity. For example,
some economists may reporttheir consulting income and honoraria on
Schedule C solely in order to be eligible forcertain deductions. How-
ever, data from the 1985Statistics of Income suggest that such personal
service activities are undertaken by only asmall proportion of Schedule
C filers, about 16 percent.12 And surely atleast some of these activities
reflect classical entrepreneurial behavior.
11For data sets focused on labor-market issues,the key criterion has been whether the
individual classifies him- or herself as being primarilyself-employed. However, the Charac-
teristics of Business Owners data set created bythe U.S. Census Bureau also uses a tax-
based definition of entrepreneurship. (See Holmesand Schmitz, 1991.)
This figure includes "business services" (advertising,management consulting, public
relations, computer services, etc.) and "accountingand bookkeeping services."Personal Income Taxes and the Growth of SmallFirms131
One might be tempted to implementan algorithm for identifying
which Schedule C filersare "serious" entrepreneurs. For example,one
could require that business income be abovesome threshold level. But
many startup enterprises have low or evenzero receipts. Another possi-
bility is that the ratio of Schedule Cincome to earned income be above
some threshold. But as already suggested, seriousentrepreneurs can
have low incomes from their enterprises.Further complications result
from using annual data. A seriousentrepreneur who starts his or her
business late in the year is likely to resemblea full-year, but non-serious,
entrepreneur.
We conclude that trying to weed out spuriousentrepreneurs from the
population of Schedule C filers is not likelyto be terribly fruitful. Never-
theless, below we experimenta bit with alternative thresholds for busi-
ness revenues as criteria for being classified as an entrepreneur,and find
that they have no serious effecton our substantive results.
4. STATISTICAL MODEL AND RESULTS
4.1 Econometric Setup
Our goal is to estimate the determinants of therate of growth of sole
proprietors' receipts between 1985 and 1988. Aswe discussed in section
2, the growth rate depends upon thetax rate facing the entrepreneur
and the parameters of his utility and productionfunctions. Given these
considerations, an appropriate empirical specificationposits that the
change in the logarithm of receipts between1985 and 1988 is a function
of the reform-induced change in the taxpricedefined to be 1 minus the
marginal tax rateand variables thatare related to the entrepreneur's
preference and technology. Specifically,we assume that the growth rate
of gross receipts, &n(GRECEIPTS), is
z.11n(GRECEIPTS) = a0 + a11.11n(TAXPRICE)+ X85f3 + e,(4.1)
where LIln(TAXPRICE) = ln(1- T88) - ln(1 - i-) and ; is the entrepreneur's
marginal tax rate in year5;x85 is a vector of characteristics of theentrepre-
neur as of 1985 (which reflect differences in utility-functionparameters)
and of the entrepreneur's industry (which reflectdifferences in produc-
tion-function parameters); and /3 is the associatedparameter vector.
An important issue related to equation (4.1)is what variables to in-
clude in the vector X85. Tax returns donot contain as rich a set of
personal variables as some other datasets, but several useful controls
are available. These variables, along with theirmeans and standard
deviations, are included in Table 2. Age is listedbecause it is related toTable entries are means and, in parentheses, standard
Column (1) contains statistics for all individuals in
positive receipts in 1985, regardless of whether they were
Colunm (2) contains statistics for the subset of those
positive receipts in both 1985 and 1988.
The tax price is defined as one minus the marginal tax
deviations.
our sample who were all proprietorswith
also sole proprietors in 1988.
individuals who were sole proprietors with
rate.





LIIn(GRECEIPTS) (log difference in gross receipts)- 0.332
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one's experience in the job market and human-capitalaccumulation;
hence, it affects the entrepreneur's production function.Age also may
affect the individual's risk aversion and hence theutility function. Previ-
ous research on entrepreneurial decisionmaking suggests thata qua-
dratic term in age is also appropriate.13 We includemarital status and the
number of dependents in view of the possibility that theymay affect the
entrepreneur's leisure-consumption preferences and riskaversion.
We include capital income as ameasure of the individual's assets,
which should affect entrepreneurial decisionmaking in thepresence of
capital-market constraints.14 However,one should note that tax-return
data on capital income are quitepoor. Our variable is the sum of re-
ported dividends and interest; it omits capital gains andmunicipal bond
interest, inter alia.15 Hence, one must be cautious ininterpreting the
coefficient on this variable as a test of the liquidity-constrainthypothesis.
Finally, using the principal business codes reportedon Schedule C, we
develop a set of dichotomous industry variables. Theseare intended to
take into account industry-specific effects, suchas the fact that demand
patterns, the parameters of the production technology, andprofitable
opportunities differ across industries.
A second major issue associated with equation (4.1)is the potential
endogeneity of the tax-price variable. Marginal taxrates, of course, vary
with taxable income. As receipts go up, taxable incomeincreases, and so
does the marginal tax rate, ceteris paribus. Thismay induce a spurious
negative relationship between Llln(TAXPRICE) and thegrowth of re-
ceipts, another manifestation of a problem ubiquitousin investigations
of the behavioral effects of taxation (see Feenberg, 1987).As in other
settings, a remedy is to estimate the equation usinginstrumental vari-
ables, which requires that we finda variable (or variables) that is corre-
lated with zllri(TAXPRICE) but is unlikely to be correlatedwith the error
term.
We construct an instrumental variable that takes advantageof the most
prominent feature of our data: the exogenous change inmarginal tax rates
due to TRA86 itself. To begin, we compute each individual'smarginal tax
13 We also estimated the model witha quartic in age, and found that it left the substantive
results essentially unchanged. Taxpayers' ages are not reportedon individual income tax
forms. Ages are added to the Individual Tax File through theuse of data provided by the
Social Security Administration.
14 See Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Holtz-Eakin,Joulfaian, and Rosen (1994a, 1994b), and
van Praag and van Ophem (1995) for evidence on the importance of liquidity constraintsto
entrepreneurial decisionmaking.
Of course, other conventional data sets also lack informationon important components
of capital income.134Carroll, Holtz-Eakin, Rider & Rosen
rate using the data and tax law for1985.16 Next we compute each individ-
ual's marginal tax rate using the data for1985 (inflated to 1988 levels), but
employing the tax law for 1988. Clearly, the changebetween the 1985 and
the 1988 tax rates computed in this fashion isdue entirely to modifications
of the tax code. Essentially, this procedure removesthe endogenous com-
ponent of tax-rate movements fromIn(TAXPRICE), leaving only the part
due to the exogenous change in the taxlaw associated with TRA86.'7
A possible concern with this strategy isbased on the notion that all of
the tax reductions associated with TRA86accrued to high-income indi-
viduals. If such individuals are somehowdifferent in unobservable ways
from the rest of the sample, then thechange in the tax price might
simply be proxying for these unobservabledifferences. To think about
this issue, it is useful to begin by notingthat, in fact, the 1986 law
changed tax rates for virtually everyone andactually increased marginal
rates at the low end. Also, it altered manyof the provisions that influ-
ence marginal tax rates,such as those relating to medical expenses,
unreimbursed business expenses, and the two-earnerdeduction. In
short, the characterization of TRA86 as affectingonly the tax prices of
high-income individuals is inaccurate.
That said, it is of some interest to documenthow much of the variation
in the change in the tax price comesfrom various segments of the in-
come distribution. To investigatethis issue, we divided the sample into
quintiles based on 1985 income, and thenexamined the percentage
change in tax price by quintile. As expected, wefound that the typical
(i.e., mean or median) change in the taxprice went up with income.
However, the standard deviation of the percentagechange was remark-
ably similar across quintiles.'t Hence, identificationof the tax price coeffi-
cient is not coming exclusively from thehigh-income part of the sample.
16We compute our marginal tax rates using detailed taxcalculators developed by the
Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. Treasury, and tailored for ourpanel. These calculators include
both the statutory rate schedule and the many implicit taxrates (e.g., the post-TRA86
phaseout of tax benefits associated with the 15-percent taxbracket and the personal exemp-
tion) that arise from special features of the tax code. Ourmarginal tax rates include the Self-
Employment Contributions Act (SECA) tax, and the socialsecurity tax for wage earners.
17An endogenous component of changes in tax ratesof particular interest is that stemming
from tax evasion. One possibility is that a cut in tax ratesreduces evasion, raises reported
taxable income, and as a consequence raises observedmarginal tax rates, ceteris paribus.
Our instrumental variable is constructed to eliminateall behavior-based changes in mar-
ginal tax rates, including those associated with evasion.The possibility remains, however,
that some of our estimated change in gross receipts isdue to changes in reporting (as
opposed to real) behavior.
1The standard deviations of the percentage change in taxprice from the lowest to the
highest income quintile are as follows: 10.6, 10.2, 10.4,14.7, 9.7.Personal Income Taxes and the Growth of SmallFirms135
The fact that our sample consists of individualswho were sole propri-
etors in both 1985 and 1988 raises a third issue. Survivalas a sole propri-
etor is not a random process; hence, estimates ofequation (4.1) may be
rendered inconsistent by selectivity bias.19 Wetake advantage of the
technique suggested by Heckman (1979)to deal with this problem. Spe-
cifically, using the sample of individuals whowere sole proprietors in
1985, we estimate a probit equation of the probabilitythat the individual
was still a sole proprietor in 1988, and then augmentequation (4.1) with
the inverse Mills ratio associated with theprobit.2° A complication arises
because the change in the log of the tax priceis endogenous in the probit
equation as well as the receipts growth equation. Wetherefore employ
instrumental variables in both equations. Thisensures consistent esti-
mates of the parameters, but complicates thecomputation of consistent
standard error. We implemented a bootstrappingprocedure to deal with
this problem, estimating the system 100 timesand computing the empiri-
cal variaricecovariance matrix of theparameter estimates.21
4.2 Basic Results
To begin, we present in column (1) of Table 3the estimates of the
parameters of equation (4.1), computed using instrumentalvariables
and correcting for selectivity biasas outlined above. From our stand-
point, the key coefficient is that on 41n(TAXPRICE),which is positive,
and exceeds its standard error bya factor greater than 5.5. Thus, the
greater the percentage increase in a sole proprietor'stax price between
1985 and 1988, the greater the increase in the sizeof his or her business.
This resolves the theoretical ambiguity withrespect to the effect of the
tax price that we discussed in Section 2. Given thatthe equation is in
log-Jog form, the coefficient on the tax-pricevariable is essentially the
elasticity of receipts with respect to thetax price. Our estimate implies
an elasticity of 0.84. This suggests, for example, thata decrease in the
marginal tax rate levied on a sole proprietor from50 to 33 percent
would lead to an increase in his receipts by about28 percent. Whether
this is a "large" effect is a matter of judgment,but it appears that
19Indeed, TRA86 embodied incentives to alter the organizational formof a business. The
main thrust was to make taxation under the individualincome tax (sole proprietorship,
partnership, Subchapter S corporation) more attractive relativeto the corporation tax; see
Carroll and Joulfaian (1995) or Plesko (1994). Hence,TRA86 was more likely to induce
entry than exit.
20Survival probability is related to initial size,as documented by Caves (1998). Hence, in
addition to the variables in equation (4.1),we include the logarithm of gross receipts of
1985.
21See Efron (1979) for a discussion.aThe left-hand-side variable in each equation is the log differencein gross receipts between 1985 and
1988. Estimation is by instrumental variables,treating 41n(TAXPRICE) as endogenous. Standard er-
rors, which are in parentheses, arecomputed by bootstrapping methods. Variables are defined in
Table 1, except for EARNINGS (household earnings in1985) and ,iln(INCOME) (log difference in net
income between 1985 and 1988). The latter variable istreated as endogenous
marginal tax rates have a substantial effect onthe growth of entrepre-
neurial enterprises.
Turning now to the otherright-hand-side variables, one finds that
both the linear and quadratic terms in age areinsignificant. Similarly, the
other indicators of the individual'seconomic and demographic situation
136Carroll, Holtz-E akin, Rider & Rosen
TABLE 3
Analysis of Receipts Growth'









z1n(TAXPRICE) 0.836 0.915 0.928 0.746
(0.149) (0.138) (0.156) (0.143)
AGE 0.268 0.370 0.489
(2.80) (2.83) (2.78)
AGE2 -0.788- -0.837 -0.988
(3.38) (3.39) (3.33)
CAPINC -0.128 -0.0827 -0.114
(0.137) (0.134) (0.131)
MARRIED 0.0107- 0.00672 0.0135
(0.0737) (0.0747) (0.0735)
DEPENDENTS 0.150- 0.156 0.152
(0.174) (0.176) (0.173)
MFG 0.464- 0.454 0.456
(0.129) (0.132) (0.129)
WHOLESALE -0.0127- -0.0306 -0.0246
(0.138) (0.139) (0.136)
RETAIL 0.132- 0.123 0.121
(0.0867) (0.0873) (0.0855)
FINANCE 0.115 0.105 0.118
(0.0832) (0.0834) (0.0828)






Inverse Mills ratio 2.18 2,13 2.22 2.16
(0.160) (0.162) (0.165) (0.158)
N 6,817 6,817 6,817 6,817Personal Income Taxes and the Growth of SmallFirms137
do not exert statistically significant influences,a finding consistent with
earlier studies that look at the evolution of variousaspects of entrepreneu-
rial enterprises (Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, andRosen, 1994a; van Praag,
Mirjam, and van Ophem, 1995).However, industry is a statistically
significant variable. In particular, entrepreneursengaged in the manufac-
turing and service sectors experiencedgreater revenue growth than their
counterparts in other sectors.23 Finally, the coefficienton the inverse
Mills ratio is positive and statistically significant,suggesting (reason-
ably) that unobserved characteristics that affectthe growth of entrepre-
neurial enterprises and their survivalare positively correlated.
An interesting question is whether thepositive effect of the tax price on
firm growth depends on thepresence of the other covariates. This question
is particularly cogent given thatsome of the right-hand-side variables,
such as marital status, might be correlated withbusiness success. To inves-
tigate this possibility, we re-estimated equation(4.1) with only a constant
and Llln(TAXPRICE). The resultsare reported in column (2) of Table 3. The
coefficient remains positive, of similar magnitude,and statistically signifi-
cant. Hence, the size and character of the tax effectsin column (1) are not
artifacts of a correlation between taxrates and other variables.
4.3 Alternative Specifications
We subjected our equation toa variety of checks to determine whether
the estimated relationship is sensitiveto the data or specification. To
begin, we included the 1985 value of familywage and salary earnings.
More than one interpretation of this variableis possible. To the extent
that earnings are attributable to theentrepreneur's spouse, they may
create an income effect for the entrepreneur. To theextent that they are
attributable to the entrepreneur, theymay be an indicator of the cost of
time that is spent in sole-proprietorship activity.If so, they are also likely
to be endogenous, the primary reason fornot including earnings in the
baseline specification reported in column (1)of Table 3. The results
when earnings are includedappear in column (3) of Table 3. The esti-
mated coefficient is negative (-0.186 witha standard error of 0.0831).
Importantly, the inclusion of the earnings variablehad essentially no
effect on the character of the tax-priceresultsthe coefficient is 0.93
with an estimated standarderror of 0.16.
While most demographic variables do notseem to be strongly correlated with changes in
various characteristics of small firms, these variablesare correlated with the probability
that a given individual is an entrepreneur. See,e.g., Meyer (1990).
23 The omitted industry categoryincludes transportation, construction, mining, agricul-
ture, and miscellaneous other industries. Theyare grouped together because, on an indi-
vidual basis, each accounts for a very small proportion of theobservations.138Carroll, Holtz-Eakin, Rider & Rosen
An important feature of TRA86 isthat it embodied changes in the tax
base as well as in marginal tax rates.For example, the itemized deduc-
tion for state sales taxes waseliminated. Thus, the tax reform generated
changes in after-tax income. Thetheoretical framework in Section 2 sug-
gests that, ceteris paribus, suchtax-base effects might affect receipts by
altering the entrepreneur's ownlabor supply and his demand for other
factors.
To investigate this possibifity, weaugmented the specification in Table 3
with the change in the log after-taxincome between 1985 and 1988.Of
course, this variable maybe endogenous for the same reasons as ourtax-
price variable. We can construct aninstrument for it analogous to that used
for our tax-price variable (i.e., compute1988 after-tax income using 1985
income data and 1988 tax structure).The estimates when the basic modelis
augmented with the difference in the logof after-tax income are reported in
column (4). The inclusion of thisvariable does not affect the nature of our
results. The coefficient on the tax priceremains positive and significant
the estimated coefficient is 0.746 with astandard error of 0.143. The coeffi-
cient on after-tax income isstatistically significant-0.O525 with astandard
error of 0.0171. The factthat increasing cash flow enhancesbusiness perfor-
mance is consistent withearlier research which shows thatliquidity con-
straints affect the decisions of smallfirms (see, e.g., Evans and Jovanovic,
1989, and Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian,and Rosen, 1994a).
Our basic specification allows forcross-industry differences in rate of
growth, but the effect of taxes isassumed to be independent of industry.
Perhaps, though, firms operating in someindustries are more tax-
sensitive than others. More specifically,the model in section 2 indicated
that tax responses depend uponproduction-function parameters, and
these may be expected to differ byindustry. To address this issue, we aug-
mented the basic specification with aseries of terms interacting the
change in the tax price with thevarious industry indicators. Wefound
that, in general, tax-price effectsdo not vary across industries. Only one
of the coefficients was statisticallysignificant. (In the service sector, the
interaction had a point estimate of 1.37with at statistic of 3.78.)24 In magni-
tude, it was larger than the estimatewithout the interaction (reported in
column (1) of Table 3), but thequantitative result was basically the same.
24 An interesting exercise would be to see if the tax-priceresults are robust to dropping
observations from the service sector altogether.However, as implied toward the bottom of
Table 2, this would involve leaving out morethan one-half the observations.
25 Our canonical specification also ignores cross-statedifferences in business environ-
ments. For example, states differ intheir regulatory and tax systems. To controlfor such
differences, we added a set of dichotomous statevariables to our basic specification. The
inclusion of these controls had little effect onthe tax-price coefficient.Personal Income Taxes and the Growth ofSmall Firms139
The theme emerging fromour discussion of Table 3 is that changes in
entrepreneurs' tax rates have a significant impacton the growth of their
enterprises. As discussed earlier, however,one may wish to tighten the
criteria for classifying Schedule C filersas entrepreneurs. To do so, we
imposed the requirement that sole proprietorsreported $500 of gross
business receipts and repeatedour statistical analysis using this smaller
(8,324 observations), more select sample. Thebasic tenor of our results is
unchanged; z.11n(TAXPRICE) continues to bepositive (0.747) and statisti-
cally significant (s.e. = 0.156) As further checks,we raised the minimum
threshold to $1,000 of business receipts, andthen to $5,000. In each case,
the estimated coefficients remainpositive and significant, although the
magnitudes diminish to 0.725 and 0.641, respectively.26
4.4 Tax Rates and Survivor Probabilities
As noted above, the results in Table3 are generated by a two-step
procedure whose first stage isa probit equation for the probability that
an individual survives as a sole proprietor from 1985to 1988. This specifi-
cation does not constrain the tax priceto have the same sign in the
survival and the receipts-growth equations.Our theoretical model indi-
cates that there is no reason to impose sucha constraint. While an
increase in the tax price may increase receiptsgrowth conditional on
remaining in business, at the same time itmay also make the salaried
sector more attractive. This renders the ultimateeffect ambiguous.
Although we have viewed this equationprimarily as a means for generat-
ing consistent estimates of thereceipts-growth model, it is of indepen-
dent interest. Specifically, the probitequation reveals how the survival
rate in self-employment depends on tax rates.27 Theprobit coefficients
are reported in column (1) of Table 4.
The coefficient on the change in the logof the tax price is negative
(-0.137) and exceeds its standarderror by only a factor of 1.3. Hence, in
An alternative concern is that some ofour entrepreneurs are "too serious"; that is, our
results may be unduly influenced by thepresence of some very large sole proprietorships
that are not representative of the small firms thatare our focus. To investigate this possibil-
ity, we deleted the 10 percent of our sample reporting thelargest gross receipts in 1985
(gross receipts greater than $803,600). Qualitatively,this has very little effect. The esti-
mated coefficient for the tax price remains positive (0.597)and statistically significant
(standard error equal to 0.126). Finally, to further honeour focus on serious, small entrepre-
neurs, we deleted both the top 10 percent as measured bygross receipts and the bottom 10
percent (gross receipts below $1,400). Again, there is littlequalitative effect on our conclu-
sions; the estimated coefficient and its standarderror are 0.693 and 0.143, respectively.
The organizational choice also dependson the tax rates applied to corporations, inter
alia. These also changed as a consequence of the TaxReform Act of 1986. (See Gordon and
MacKie-Mason, 1997.) However, the change appliedto all individuals, and hence does not
require any special control in our analysis.140Carroll, Holtz-E akin, Rider & Rosen
TABLE 4
Probit Analysis of Self-EmploymentDecisions'
Probit estimates. Figures in parentheses are standard errors.R denotes gross receipts, and the other
variables are as defined in Table 1.
bcolunm (1) is estimated over the sample of individuals who weresole proprietors in 1985. The left-
hand-side variable is one if the individual was also asole proprietor in 1988 and zero otherwise. The
estimation is by instrumental variables, with thechange in the log of tax price treated as endogenous.
CColunm (2), like column (1), estimates the probability ofsurviving as a sole proprietor from 1985 to
1988. However, the change in the log of the taxprice is not instrumented.
dColunms (3) and (4) are estimated over the sample of sole proprietorsand wage earners in 1985. The
left-hand-side variable is one if the individual was a soleproprietor in 1985 and zero otherwise.
Variable (l)b (2)c (3)d (4)d
INTERCEPT -1.18 -1.26 -0.0994 -5.32







AGE -0.268 -0.0453 2.40
(2.15) (2.13) (1.50)
AGE2 0.803 0.612- -1.63
(2.58) (2.59) (1.84)
CAPINC -0.0565 -0.0464 0.240
(0.0519) (0.0454) (0.0296)
MARRIED 0.0148 0.0220 0.492
(0.0604) (0.0603) (0.0425)
DEPENDENTS -0.0834 -0.0720 -0.253
(0.149) (0.134) (0.103)
MFG 0.0440 0.0393 7.01
(0.112) (0.109) (87.2)
WHOLESALE -0.259 -0.265 7.03
(0.106) (0.108) (86.9)
RETAIL -0.0994 -0.118- 3.88
(0.0490) (0.0590) (0.144)
FINANCE -0.0875 -0.0938 7.05
(0.0507) (0.0597) (38.8)
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our data, higher taxes exert their major effecton the growth rates of
existing firms as opposed to their survivalprobabilities.
Recall that the probit model is estimated byinstrumental variables
because of the endogeneity of thetax price. Colun-u-i (2) reports the
results when endogeneity is ignored. Likeits counterpart in the instru-
mental-variables model of column (1), the coefficienton the tax price is
negative. However, it is larger in absolute valueand it is statistically
significant (the coefficient exceeds its standarderror by a factor of almost
5). Hence, failing to correct for endogeneity leadsto the incorrect infer-
ence that increases in tax rates increase the probability ofsurviving as an
entrepreneur.
This finding leads to aconcern about a technical issue. In the probit
context, the instrumental-variables proceduregenerates consistent esti-
mates only if the error terms in both the first- andsecond-stage equa-
tions are jointly normally distributed and bothequations are correctly
specified. In a linear model the conditionsare considerably less strin-
gent. The right-hand-side variables in the first-stageequation have to be
imcorrelated with the error term in the second-stageequation, but con-
sistent estimates may be obtainedeven if some variables that belong in
the first-stage equation are omitted. Therefore,despite the well-known
limitations of the linear probability model,it seemed worthwhile to use
it to check our estimates. The coefficienton the tax price is more pre-
cisely estimated in the linear probability modelthan in the probit model.
The coefficient, 0.0797, exceeds itsstandard error by almost a factor of
three. However, the implied elasticity of theprobability of survival with
respect to the tax price, evaluated at themeans, is essentially zero,
0.012. Hence, while strong assumptionsare needed to deal with
endogeneity in the probit model, the basicqualitative result holds when
the analysis is done using themore robust linear probability modeltax
rates do not greatly affect survivorship probabilities.
There are not many results in the literaturewith which we can com-
pare this finding. The most directly comparable studyis Bruce (1999),
whose analysis of U.S. panel data indicatedthat higher tax rates reduce
the probability of exiting self-employment.Gentry and Hubbard (2000)
examined a different type of transition, entry intoself-employment, and
found that the probability of entryincreases when tax rates are less
progressive. The remaining related studieswe have found in effect ana-
lyze the contemporaneous relationshipbetween the propensity to be
self-employed and taxes, at either theaggregate or the individual level.
Parker (1996), Blau (1987), and Fairlie and Meyer(1999) examined the
time-series relationship between aggregateself-employment rates and
tax rates. Parker (with U.K. data) and Blau (withU.S. data) found that142Carroll, Holtz-Eakin, Rider & Rosen
higher tax rates encourageself-employment.28 On the other hand, Fairlie
and Meyer's examination of U.S.data over the course of the twentieth
century indicated no relationship.Robson and Wren (1999) found a
negative relationship betweenself-employment rates and marginal tax
rates in a panel study of OECDcountries during the 1980s. Long's(1982)
analysis of U.S. cross-sectional dataindicated that higher taxes are associ-
ated with a greater probability of beingself-employed.
None of the above studies use tax-returndata; hence, it is of interest
to re-estimate these earliermodels using our data. Our sampleallows
us to estimate amodel that is in the spirit of the studiesthat focus on
the contemporaneous relationshipbetween the propensity to be self-
employed and marginal tax rates.Specifically, we analyze the links
between the probability that anindividual is a sole proprietor and his
or her tax price inthe 1985 cross section. To begin, weestimate a
simple probit in which the onlyright-hand-side variable is the loga-
rithm of the individual's tax price.The results are in column (3) of
Table 4. In column (4) we augmentthis model with the usual set of
covariates. Note that the tax-pricevariable goes from being negative
and statistically significant in column(3) to positive and significant in
column (4). This suggests thatcross-sectional relationships between
self-employment probabilities and tax rates aresensitive to the particu-
lar covariates included in the equation.This problem may be com-
pounded if no correction is made for theendogeneity of the tax price, a
task that is likely to be quite difficult in asingle cross section.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Policymakers have long beenconcerned about the possible inhibiting
effects of taxes on small businesses,but not much is known about the
relationship between tax rates and businessgrowth. In this paper, we
have focused on the empirical relationshipbetween a sole proprietor's
personal income tax rate and the growthof the receipts from his enter-
prise. We examine tax-return data forsole proprietors from before and
after the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Wefind that when a sole proprietor's
marginal tax rate goes up, the rate ofgrowth of his enterprise goes
down. The elasticity of receipts withrespect to the tax price (one minus
the marginal tax rate) is about 0.84.This implies, for example, that a
This finding is generally rationalized byconsiderations not included in our simple
theoretical model. Higher tax rates are associatedwith higher returns to tax evasion or
offer "insurance" against entrepreneurialrisk. As already noted, our model can generate a
positive correlation between tax rates andself-employment probabilities without appealing
to such factors.Personal Income Taxes and the Growth of Small Firms143
decrease in the marginal tax rate leviedon a sole proprietor from 50
percent to 33 percent would lead toan increase in his receipts by about
28 percent. Of course, entrepreneurs alsooperate in organizational
forms other than sole proprietorships. Our resultssuggest that it would
be worthwhile to explore whether taxes discouragethe growth of such
enterprises as well.
APPENDIX
This appendix formalizes our framework foranalyzing the effects of
personal taxation on the growth and survival probabilitiesof entrepre-
neurial enterprises. As in the main text,we first focus on how taxes
affect the entrepreneur's input decisions and then deducethe implica-
tions for firm size.
To fix ideas, it is useful to revisit the derivation of theinfluence of
taxation on individuals' decisions as wageearners because the underly-
ing forces are easily elucidated in this setting. Specifically,assume that
individuals choose their labor supply e ("effort")to maximize utility
U(c,e), (A.1)
where c is consumption. The budget constraint is
c = w(1 - T)e + A, (A.2)
where w is the wage, T is the tax rate, and Ais non-labor income.
Choosing e to maximize (A.1) yields the familiarnecessary condition for
determining labor supply,
lJ + w(1- T)Ue = 0. (A.3)
When the net wage changes due to,say, a reduction in taxes, then the
optimal effort changes as well:
de - (U + weLI + Uee)
0, (A.4) dw(1 - T)w2Ua, + 2WUce + Uee
where subscripts denote partial derivatives. This isthe textbook model
of labor supply, in which the conflict of income andsubstitution effects
yields no firm prediction regarding whether effortwifi rise or fall. It is





where aw(1 - T)e/c, crUc/L and °EUecC/Ue.
We turn next to entrepreneurs. At the outset, weanalyze decisions
conditional on the entrepreneur always remainingin business; the possi-
bility of exiting to wage earning isintroduced later. We assume that
output of the entrepreneurial enterpriseis determined by the production
function F(e,e), where we assume for simplicitythat labor, e, is the only
purchased input.29 Normalizing the output price tounity and defining
the tax price p as one minus the tax rate,the entrepreneur's budget
constraint is
c = j4F(e,) - w] +A. (A.6)
The entrepreneur chooses e and 1 so as tomaximize utility, yielding the
pair of first-order conditions
- w) = 0, (A.7)
U()F. + U, = 0. (A.8)
To determine the impact of a reduction in taxes,note that (A.7) implies
d /dp = - (F8,/F)de/dp, so that the impact onhiring decisions is tied to
the impact on the entrepreneur's owneffort. Turning to the latter, the
first-order conditions imply that
de {UF. + [F(e,e) - w](.tF,U. + U,)}
dtUc(Fee) + UFee +2F2U,, +FeUce + + U,,
Not surprisingly, expression (A.9) isambiguous. However, if (A.5) is
satisfied, the substitution effect will dominatethe income effect and a
reduction in taxes wifi raise e. When is thislikely to be the case? Intu-
itively, the greater the share of consumptionfinanced by business profit
(a), the greater wifi be the importanceof the marginal utility of consump-
tion to the decision to supply effort tothe business. Also, the more
We focus on a single purchased input forexpositional clarity alone. Our approach is
readily generalized to situations in whichentrepreneurial ventures use multiple purchased
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rapidly the marginal utility of consumption declines,ceteris paribus, the
less likely it is that additional profits will induce effort.
To determine the implications for the effect of taxationon the receipts
of the enterprise, recall that (because the output priceis unity) gross
receipts are given by R = F(e,). It follows that
dR/ -F,F, \ de+F I.
dj.t\F 'Jdp.
(A.1O)
Inspection of (A.1O) indicates that the effect of taxeson receipts depends
upon their effect on effort, but also upon the parameters of the produc-
tion function. In any case, because de/dis ambiguous, so is the effect
on receipts.
We arrived at equation (A.1O) by assuming thatentrepreneurs wifi
always remain in business. In fact, however, there is always theoption
of exiting to the wagesalary sector. Hence,we consider the impact of
taxes on survival as well. Let ye denote the maximal utility achievedas
an entrepreneur, and
Wthe corresponding maximal valueas an em-
ployee. Then the impact of taxes on the difference in utility, andhence
the incentive to remain an entrepreneur, is
d(V' - Va')
U[F(e*,*) - we*]- U(we), (A.11) dj.
where the superscripts * and + indicate the optimal decisionsas an entre-
preneur and as a wage earner, respectively. Without a priori information
regarding the marginal utility of consumption in eachsector of the econ-
omy, the effect of taxes is ambiguous, as observed in the main text.
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